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DUE PROCESS-PRO SE DEFENSE
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
On June 30, 1975, the United States Supreme
Court handed down a decision in Faretta v. Califor-
nia, I which dealt with the right of an accused in a
state criminal trial "to make a defense as we know
it. '"2 The Court held that a criminal defendant pos-
sesses an affirmative right of self-representation,
which is implied in the sixth amendment s and in-
corporated into the fourteenth amendment through
the due process clause.' The right of self-represen-
tation is independent of the guarantee of assistance
of counsel, and a defendant who knowingly and
intelligently refuses counsel and insists upon con-
ducting his own defense may not be deprived of that
right by the trial court.
Faretta involved an indigent criminal defendant
who claimed that he would be prejudiced by the pub-
lic defender's heavy case load. Following his ar-
raignment on a charge of grand theft in the Superior
Court of Los Angeles, Anthony Faretta applied to
the judge for permission to dispense with the ser-
vices of the appointed public defender and to repre-
1422 U.S. 806 (1975).
21Id. at 818. In another decision rendered on the same
day. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975), the Court
found that the right to make a defense includes the right to
make a summation. In Herring the Court struck down a
New York statute, N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 320.20(3) (c)
(McKinney 1971), which permitted thejudge in a nonjury
criminal trial to deny counsel permission to make closing
arguments, thereby violating the defendant's sixth amend-
ment guarantee of the right to assistance of counsel in his
defense.
3
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall erjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an im-
partial jury of the state and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed... and to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor; and to have the assistance of Counsel for
his defense.
4Not all rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights against
infringement by the federal government are automatically
incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court
held the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel
obligatory upon the states, and in Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965), the sixth amendment guarantee of con-
frontation was made applicable to the states. Once the fed-
eral right is found to apply to the states, the distinctions be-
tween federal and state requirements disappear.
sent himself. The court reluctantly granted his re-
quest but subsequently called a hearing to inquire
into Faretta's ability to conduct his own defense.
After questioning the defendant as to his knowledge
of the hearsay rule and voir dire procedures, the
judge ruled that he had not made a knowing and
intelligent waiver of his right to counsel,' and that
he had no constitutional right to conduct his own
defense. a Faretta's later request to act as co-counsel
was denied, as were his motions for the appointment
of counsel other than the public defender. The trial
court, having heard the case presented by the public
defender, convicted Faretta and sentenced him to
prison. The California court of appeals upheld the
ruling against self-representation and affirmed the
conviction,' and the California Supreme Court
denied review.
'The standard for waiver of counsel in federal criminal
trials was delineated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938). In this case, the defendants were indicted on one
day and without benefit of counsel were arraigned, tried,
convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary two days later.
The Supreme Court found no merit in the Government's
contention that, since the defendants had proceeded to trial
without requesting counsel, they had waived the right. The
Court held that the trial judge has the responsibility of
determining whether an accused has competently, know-
ingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel, and that
this determination should appear on the record. See also
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962), where the Court
found that the principles of Johnson v. Zerbst are, under the
fourteenth amendment, equally applicable to asserted waiv-
ers of the right to counsel in state criminal proceedings.
6422 U.S. at 811-12.
'Both lower courts relied upon a recently-decided
California Supreme Court decision, People v. Sharp, 7 Cal.
3d 448, 499 P.2d 489, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972), which
had determined that a defendant in a criminal proceeding
has no right of self-representation under either the Califor-
nia or United States Constitutions. In Sharp, the accused
advised the trial court through his court-appointed attorney
that he wished to represent himself but also desired to have
a lawyer "sit by me and give me a little advice." The court
denied his request. The state supreme court affirmed,
holding that although the United States Supreme Court had
recognized the right to waive counsel, the fact that it had
imposed conditions on the right of waiver gave that right
less stature than the constitutional right which was being
waived.
Although not material to the case, it is interesting to note
that while Sharp was in the courts, California amended
article 1, section 13 of its constitution to delete any right to
self-representation and to give the legislature power to
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Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,9 noted
the existence of a firm foundation in California rules
of procedure upon which the California courts based
their decision. 9 Nevertheless, he found a federal
constitutional right of self-representation, supported
by a history of self-representation in both England
and the United States. That right has been protected
by statute in federal courts since the Judiciary Act of
1789,1 enacted by the First Congress. The Court
noted that "with few exceptions," the states also
recognize a right of self-representation. Thirty-six
states have adopted constitutional provisions to that
effect," and in addition, many state courts have
found a federal constitutional right. "
Conceding that the United States Supreme Court
has never explicitly held that the right exists, Justice
Stewart cites several prior decisions which, he
argues, imply or support a constitutional right to
represent oneself. In Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, " the Court recognized that the right of
assistance of counsel implies a "correlative right to
dispense with a lawyer's help," while in Snyder v.
require a defendant in a felony case to have the assitance of
counsel.
'Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, Marshall and
Powell joined in the opinion.
'422 U.S. at 812 n.8. The California courts' decisions
were based on several "not unusual" rules of procedure:
(1) a criminal defendant has no right to appointed counsel
of his choice; (2) the defendant is bound by the decisions
of his attorney; and (3) a conviction is valid except where
counsel is so incompetent as to make of the trial "a farce
and a sham."
"Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92, as
amended 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970):
In all courts of the United States the parties may
plead and conduct their own cases personally or by
counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively,
are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.
"422 U.S. at 813. These states are: Alabama, Ari-
zona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
121d. at 813-14.
"317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942). This was a case in which
the defendant was charged with using the mails to de-
fraud. He ihsisted upon repreenting himself, and after
the trial court determined that he was educated, articulate,
and had studied some law, he was permitted to conduct his
own defense. He waived trial by jury, and was found guilty
as charged and sentenced to the penitentiary. On appeal he
claimed that his uncounselled waiver of jury trial was
invalid. The Supreme Court, relying on Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458 (1938) (see note 5 supra) and Patton v.
Massachusetts, 4 Justice Cardozo for the majority
wrote that the confrontation clause gives the accused
the right to be present where fundamental fairness
requires it, "for it will be in his power . . . even to
supersede his lawyers altogether and conduct the
trial himself." In Price v. Johnston, " the Court
United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930) (in which a unanimous
court affirmed the power of a defendant to waive trial by
jury), found that the waivers of counsel and of jury were
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made, and there-
fore not violative of the sixth amendment. Justice Frankfur-
ter, writing for the Court, did not reach the issue of an affir-
mative right to self-representation, and it is not clear
whether he would find one:
The short of the matter is that an accused, in the ex-
ercise of a free and intelligent choice, and with the
considered approval of the court, may waive trial by
jury, and so likewise may he competently and in-
telligently waive his Constitutional right to assist-
ance of counsel.
317 U.S. at 275 (emphasis added).
Faretta narrows the possible interpretations of what is
meant by "the considered approval of the court," and
imposes on a judge the duty to acquiesce in a defendant's
request to waive counsel so long as the waiver is knowing
and intelligent, and the defendant is competent to make the
choice.
11291 U.S. 97 (1934). Snyder and his companions were
convicted of the murder of a gas station attendant. On
appeal Snyder claimed a denial of due process under the
fourteenth amendment because at trial the judge had not
permitted him to be present while the jury, accompanied by
judge, prosecutor and defense counsel, viewed the scene of
the crime. Justice Cardozo distinguished between the
"privilege of presence" and the "privilege of confronta-
tion," noting that due process requires the privilege of
presence only as fairness dictates; the privilege of confron-
tation is guaranteed as a fundamental right which does not
depend on fairness. The privilege of presence at trial is
assured to a defendant by the sixth amendment when his
presence "bears a relation ... to his opportunity to
defend." Id. at 106.
15334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948). In this case, a federal
prisoner, alleging that he had been convicted by the
knowing use of false testimony, prepared his own petitions
for habeas corpus. The district court denied his petitions
and he appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, asking for an order directing his appearance in
court so that he might argue his appeal. The court of
appeals held it was without power to make such an order.
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held that the
court had discretionary power to call for the appear-
ance of the prisoner for oral argument. Justice Murphy,
writing for the majority, raised but did not answer the
question of the prisoner who refuses the aid of counsel:
The difficulty, of course, arises when one of the
parties is a prisoner who has no lawyer and who de-
sires that none be appointed to represent him, being
of the belief that the case is of such a nature that only
he himself can adequately discuss the facts and
issues .... [O]rdinarily the court cannot designate
counsel for the prisoner without his consent.
Id. at 280.
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found no absolute right of a defendant orally to argue
his own appeal, in "sharp contrast" to his "recog-
nized privilege of conducting his own defense at the
trial." And in Carter v. Illinois, 16 the Court stated:
"Under appropriate circumstances the Constitution
requires that counsel be tendered; it does not require
that under all circumstances counsel be forced upon a
defendant." "
Justice Stewart points out that federal appellate
courts have frequently recognized the existence of a
constitutional right of self-representation. 8 He cites
in particular the holding of the Second Circuit in
United States v. Plattner, " in which the court held
16329 U.S. 173, 174-75 (1946). Carter was an unedu-
cated indigent who in the absence of counsel entered a plea
of guilty to an indictment for murder. He was found guilty
and sentenced to prison for ninety-nine years. Justice
Frankfurter for the majority found that the trial judge's
attestation that the defendant, with his rights explained,
consciously chose to dispense with counsel is sufficient to
satisfy due process. The Carter majority distinguished that
case from Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945), where the
record contained specific allegations bearing on the compe-
tence of the defendant to stand trial without the aid of
counsel. Four dissenting justices in Carter complained of
the absence in the record of affirmative evidence of the
competence of the defendant and of an intelligent waiver.
"As the dissent in Faretta, 422 U.S. at 840 (Burger,
C. J., dissenting) points out and Justice Stewart concedes,
the language cited by the majority is dicta. In both Adams
and Carter the accused, having insisted upon the right to
act without a lawyer, was permitted by the trial court to do
so. Both defendants later sought to have their convictions
set aside, Adams because of an uncounselled waiver of jury
and Carter because of an uncounselled guilty plea. The
Court found that each defendant had properly waived the
assistance of counsel. In Snyder the Court held that a de-
fendant has no absolute right to be present with his counsel
at a view by the jury, and in Price the Court decided that a
federal prisoner has no absolute right to appear in person
for oral argument before the appellate court. In none of the
cited cases was the defendant denied permission to dismiss
his court-appointed attorney and to represent himself at
trial, so that an affirmative right of self-representation was
not in issue.
1"422 U.S. at 816.
"9330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964). The defendant was
convicted of transporting a stolen automobile in interstate
commerce. He filed a petition for a writ of error coram
nobis alleging his guilty plea had been induced by a
prosecutor's unfulfilled promise. The judge granted a
rehearing and, without Plattner's consent, appointed an
attorney for him, thus refusing the defendant's request to
represent himself. The appellate court held that a defend-
ant in the trial of a criminal case, including a coram nobis
proceeding, has the right to conduct his case pro se. Judge
Medina for the majority found the right to arise from the
sixth amendment, not merely from the federal statute
(see note 10 supra):
This statute gives more elaborate expression to the
meaning of the terse language of the Bill of Rights
that the sixth amendment right to assistance of
counsel is a right supplemental to the other rights
guaranteed to the defendant and inferior to "the
absolute and primary right to conduct one's own
defense in propria persona. "2
The majority also found support for its holding in
the structure of the sixth amendment itself: the rights
to notice, confrontation and compulsory process
constituting "the right . . . to make a defense as we
know it." These three rights are personal to the
accused; they are granted not to his counsel but to
him. Thus, the sum of these rights-i.e., the right to
make a defense-is also personal to the accused. This
right to make one's own defense augments the
right to assistance of counsel; it arises generally
from the sixth amendment, not merely from the
assistance of counsel clause. A lawyer who has been
accepted by the defendant may bind that defendant
by his decisions, but the lawyer's right to appear at
all stems solely from the defendant's consent. If the
defendant refuses to give consent, he nevertheless
retains a full right to present his own defense in the
way he perceives to be in his own best interest. Thus,
concludes Justice Stewart, the natural interpretation
of the sixth amendment is to imply a right of
self-representation which is personal to the accused
and may be waived only by him. 2
In supporting the majority decision, Justice Stew-
art examines the history of British criminal justice.
He notes that no tribunal other than the nefarious
Star Chamber has ever required counsel for an un-
willing defendant and points out that early com-
mon-law practice included self-representation in
prosecution for serious crime. The right of counsel
developed slowly, and even after it received recogni-
tion in civil and misdemeanor cases, it was forbidden
for treason or felony. 22 Thus, the right to make a
defense was synonymous with the right to appear
and indicates, we think, the Constitutional right to
"the assistance of counsel" was intended to include
the rights of defendants in criminal cases "to plead
and manage their own causes personally."
330 F.2d at 274.
2 Id. As the Chief Justice points out in Faretta, no other
federal appellate court case cited by the majority found a
violation of a right to self-representation. 422 U.S. at 843.
"Id. at 832.
"Id. at 823. None of the rights which are regarded as
basic to a fair adversary proceeding-the rights to notice,
confrontation, compulsory process, or assistance of counsel
-were available in sixteenth and seventeenth century
England to persons accused of serious crimes. Cf. 5 W. S.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 190-94
(1924); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND. THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 211 (2d ed. 1898).
[Vol. 66
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pro se. Modern British law clearly recognizes an
affirmative right of self-representation. 2
The American colonists took for granted the right
of self-representation, and coupled this with a
healthy distrust of lawyers. As a result, no state or
colony, prior to the drafting of the sixth amendment,
had ever forced counsel upon an unwilling defendant.
"The right to counsel was clearly thought to supple-
ment the primary right of the accused to defend
himself, utilizing his personal rights to notice, con-
frontation and compulsory process." Justice Stewart
provides an exhaustive list of colonial and early state
court decisions and state constitutional provisions
which protected the right of self-representation, and
concludes that the sixth amendment, adopted in this
climate, "necessarily implies the right of self-
representation." 24
The majority concedes that the basic premise of
the right to counsel cases, 2 5 including Powell v.
Alabama, 26 Johnson v. Zerbst, 27 Gideon v. Wain-
2 King v. Woodward, [1944] 1 K.B. 118 (C.A. 1943).
The defendant's appointed counsel was changed shortly
before trial and the defendant, in the belief that new coun-
sel was not well prepared, asked to be allowed to conduct
his own defense. The request was refused. The British
court held that the accused "was refused what we think
was his right to make his own case to the jury instead of
having it made for him by counsel."
24422 U.S. at 832.
2 5In a line of cases from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932) to Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) the
Court expanded the application of the sixth amendment
right to counsel clause to indigent defendants in state
criminal prosecutions, holding that the states have a duty to
provide counsel for those who cannot afford to hire a
lawyer.
26287 U.S. 45 (1932). In this case, seven young blacks
were charged with the rape of two white girls. All the
defendants were illiterate and residents of states other than
Alabama. No lawyer was named or definitely designated by
the Alabama trial court to represent them at their trials.
Moreover: each trial began six days after indictment and
was completed within a single day. All the defendants were
found guilty as charged and sentenced to death. The
Court on appeal found that forcing the defendants to trial
without providing adequate time for them to obtain coun-
sel and prepare a defense is not consistent with due
process of law, and that:
[I]n a capital case, where the defendant is unable to
employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of mak-
ing his own defense because of ignorance, feeble
mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of
the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel
for him as a necessary requisite of due process of
law.
Id. at 71.
27304 U.S. 458 (1938). Johnson held that unless
properly waived, the assistance of counsel is a necessary
element of the trial court's jurisdiction to proceed to
conviction and sentence. See note 5 supra.
wright, 2" and Argersinger v. Hamlin,2 9 is that the
assistance of counsel is essential to assure a fair trial.
But the Court in Faretta lays greater stress on the
defendant's freedom of choice, and declares that the
notion of compulsory counsel is repugnant to our
ideas of personal liberty:
[Ilt is one thing to hold that every defendant, rich or
poor, has the right to assistance of counsel, " and quite
another to say that a State may compel a defendant to
accept a lawyer he does not want .... To force a
lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that
the law contrives against him.2 '
Although a trial judge may not force an attorney
upon a defendant who has clearly and competently
waived assistance of counsel, he must determine
whether the waiver was knowingly and intelligently
made; he must make the accused aware of the
28372 U.S. 335 (1963). The indigent defendant had been
indicted for breaking and entering with intent to commit a
misdemeanor, a felony offense. The court denied his request
that an attorney be appointed for him, ruling that the state
need provide counsel only in a capital case. The Supreme
Court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel
extends to all felony prosecutions, not merely those for
capital offenses, and is essential to due process of law:
[I]n our adversary system of justice, any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, can-
not be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided
for him.
Id. at 344.
29407 U.S. 25 (1972). This indigent defendant was
charged with carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor
offense punishable under Florida law by up to six months'
imprisonment and a $1000 fine. Unrepresented by counsel,
he was tried before a judge without a jury, convicted, and
sentenced to ninety days in jail. The Supreme Court held
that, absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person
may be imprisoned for any offense unless he was repre-
sented by counsel at trial. Justice Douglas in his majority
opinion stated: "The assistance of counsel is often a
requisite to the very existence of a fair trial." Id. at 31.
30422 U.S. at 833. This oblique reference is the only
place in the opinion where Justice Stewart alludes to the
notion of equal protection which underlies the right to
counsel cases.
"Id. In his majority opinion in Mayer v. City of
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), concerning an indigent's
right to obtain a free transcript of his trial for use on appeal
from a misdemeanor conviction, Justice Brennan voices a
similar theme:
"Justice, if it can be measured, must be measured
by the experience the average citizen has with the
police and the lower courts." Arbitrary denial of
appellate review of proceedings of the State's low-
est trial courts may save the State some dollars and
cents, but only at the substantial risk of generat-
ing frustration and hostility toward its courts
among the most numerous consumers of justice.
Id. at 197-98, quoting Murphy, The Role of Police in our
Modem Society, 26 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 292, 293
(1971).
dangers of dispensing with trained counsel; and he
must establish an affirmative record that the waiver
was properly effected in accordance with the waiver
test of Johnson " and Adams. " The defendant's legal
knowledge and skills are irrelevant to this determina-
tion, since the only matter at issue is the defendant's
competence to make the choice, not his competence to
conduct his defense. 34
The minority, on the other hand, finds the
Constitution silent on a right of self-representation
and reminds us of former Chief Justice Warren's
view in Singer v. United States: 31 "The ability to
waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry
with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that
right." The crux of the minority position is the
notion that a layman is not capable of conducting his
own defense, nor is he capable of judging whether he
may safely dispense with an attorney. The three
minority Justices feel that basic to the holdings in the
right to counsel cases is the premise that the right to
counsel is not supplementary, but integral to the
defense of an accused, and may be essential to
fundamental fairness. Rather than a strict rule, the
Court should approve a case-by-case determination.
One function of the trialjudge should be to determine
whetherjustice requires the rejection of an attempted
waiver of counsel.
In his dissenting opinion,3 6 joined by Justices
Blackmun and Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger
points out that the prosecution in our adversary
system is "more than an oridnary litigant" and that,
in the pursuit of justice, judge and prosecution are
legitimately concerned with the quality of the repre-
sentation of the accused at trial. The goal of our
system of criminal justice is "ill-served, and the
integrity of and public confidence in the system are
undermined, when an easy conviction is obtained due
to the defendant's ill-advised decision to waive
counsel." In the absence of explicit language in the
sixth amendment granting a right of self-representa-
tion, the amendment guarantees "the fullest possible
defense," including the power of the trialjudge in his
discretion to refuse to accept a waiver of counsel, just
as he possesses the discretion to refuse to accept a
32304 U.S. 458. See note 5 supra.
11317 U.S. 269. See note 13 supra.
31422 U.S. at 836.
3-380 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1965). In federal district court,
the defendant offered to waive trial by jury in order to
shorten the trial. The prosecution objected, and the defend-
ant was convicted by a jury. In a unanimous decision, the
Court held that the Constitution does not grant criminal
defendants a right to have their cases tried before the bench.
36422 U.S. at 836.
plea of guilty. 37 A defendant's lack of technical legal
skills is very much in point, as it does not serve
justice to permit the defendant freedom of choice
simply because he superficially understands what he
is doing. "The system of criminal justice should not
be available as an instrument of self-destruction."
38
The Chief Justice takes issue with the majority's
interpretation of prior cases. He argues that the
Court's reliance on the dicta in Adams3" and
Carter' is misplaced; that these cases merely deal
with the consequences of waiver and not with an
affirmative right of self-representation. All that
Adams and Carter mean, according to the Chief
Justice, is that a defendant who waives counsel may
not afterwards claim that his uncounselled actions
are constitutionally defective. Snyder" is also de-
clared irrelevant; a defendant's right to supersede his
lawyers is rooted by Justice Cardozo in notions of
fundamental fairness, not in the confrontation clause.
The Court in Price4 2 made a distinction between the
"constitutional prerogative" to be present at trial
and the "recognized privilege" of self-representation,
implying that the latter stems only from the statute. "
Plattner, the only cited appellate court case in
which the right to defend pro se was at issue, is a
decision which the Chief Justice considers to be
"largely based on a misreading of Adams and Price
which the Court perpetuates in its opinion today."'
Most of the history Which the Court examines is
dismissed by the Chief Justice as irrelevant. The only
historical fact he finds significant is that the text of
the sixth amendment, proposed one day after the
3 7The Chief Justice cites Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257 (1971), in which he wrote the majority opinion.
In this case, the detendant entered a plea of guilty in
reliance upon a promise made by the prosecutor. A new
prosecutor breached the bargain, and the defendant sought
to withdraw his plea. The Justices were unanimous in
holding that plea bargaining when properly administered
should be encouraged, but split on the proper relief in this
case. Five Justices held that the state should have the option
of determining the proper remedy, while four Justices felt
that the defendant must be permitted to withdraw his plea.
In the course of his opinion, the Chief Justice, in discussing
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, wrote: "There is, of course, no
absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted . . . .A court
may reject a plea in the exercise of sound judicial discre-
tion." Id. at 262.
38422 U.S. at 840.
39317 U.S. 269 (1942). See notes 13 and 17 supra.
'0329 U.S. 173 (1946). See note 16 supra.
"1291 U.S. 97 (1934). See note 14 supra.
42334 U.S. 266 (1948). See note 15 supra.
41Compare Justice Cardozo's discussion of "the privi-
lege" of presence and "the privilege" of confrontation of
witnesses in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. at 107.
44330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964). See note 21 supra.
'"422 U.S. at 843.
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Judiciary Act 6 was signed, does not explicitly
guarantee a right of self-representation. Mention of
the right in the Act and its omission from the amend-
ment leads to the conclusion that the omission was
intentional. Furthermore, if the right of self-repre-
sentation had been considered by the framers to be
so important as to require constitutional protection,
it appears to the Chief Justice highly unlikely that
they would have left it to implication.
Chief Justice Burger concludes with an argument
to which he is no stranger: the impact of the decision
on our already-overcrowded courts. "Society has the
right to expect that, when courts find new rights
implied in the Constitution, their potential effect
upon the resources of our criminal justice system will
be considered." 47 He finds the majority indifferent
to these considerations, and points out that if many
defendants avail themselves of this new right, their
inexperienced handling of their defense may cause
trials of longer duration which are more subject
to reversal in the appellate courts.
Justice Blackmun, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion," is also
concerned about the effect on our criminal justice
system of the constitutionalization of the right to
self-representation, particularly the possibility of
frequent procedural confusion. Closely analyzing the
Court's reasoning as to a sixth amendment source of
the right, Justice Blackmun disagrees with the
majority's position that "because the accused has a
personal right to 'a defense as we know it,' he
necessarily has a right to make that defense person-
ally." Although the rights are personal, the proce-
dural mechanism to insure them is not defined by the
amendment:
If an accused has enjoyed a speedy trial by an
impartial jury in which he was informed of the nature
of the accusation, confronted with the witnesses
against him, afforded the power of compulsory process,
and represented effectively by competent counsel, I do
not see that the Sixth Amendment requires more.49
Historically, the evidence of a fundamental right of
self-representation is inconclusive, argues Justice
Blackmun. The right to self-representation was
important only so long as the defendant was disquali-
fied as a witness, as he was until the middle of the
nineteenth century. With the abolition of this com-
mon-law disqualification, the raison d'tre of the
"Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92, as
amended. U.S.C. § 1654 (1970).
'422 U.S. at 845.
'I1d. at 846.
4Id. at 848.
right to self-representation disappeared. 5 In addi-
tion, the Court's elaboration of the right to counsel
has been based on the premise that representation by
counsel is essential to insure a fair trial. Justice
Blackmun urges that protection of the defendant's
right of free choice is not a sufficient reason to curb
the interest of the State in the administration of
justice, for the solemn business of conducting a trial
should not depend on the whim of the defendant. 51
Justice Blackmun concludes with a list of proce-
dural problems which he sees as besetting trial courts
in the future when confronted with an accused who
insists on defending pro se:
Must every defendant be advised of his right to proceed
pro se? If so, when must that notice be given? Since the
right to assistance of counsel and the right to self-
representation are mutually exclusive, how is the
waiver of each right to be measured? If a defendant has
elected to exercise his right to proceed pro se, does he
still have a constitutional right to assistance of standby
counsel? How soon in the criminal proceeding must a
defendant decide between proceeding by counsel or pro
se? Must he be allowed to switch in midtrial? May a
violation of the right to self-representation ever be
harmless error? Must the trial court treat the pro se
defendant differently than it would professional
counsel? "
Justice Blackmun's questions are not the only ones
which are stimulated by the decision. In a joint trial
of two or more conspirators, where one defendant
insists upon his right of self-representation, grant-
ing that request will prejudice the rights of his co-
defendants? Or if, during the course of a trial,
the presiding judge determines that absence of
counsel in the case before him is detrimental to the
existence of a fair trial, may he then constitutionally
appoint counsel over the objections of the defend-
ant? Questions are also raised as to the rights of a
defendant representing himself during the pre-trial
period. One issue is whether an incarcerated de-
fendant must be given freedom through bail, tempo-
rary release, or otherwise, to interview witnesses
and to take such other steps as may be needed to
prepare an effective defense.
If, as the Court in Faretta holds, the right to make
a defense belongs exclusively to the defendant and
making a defense includes a right to the assistance of
counsel, then the question arises whether the
trial court may justifiably exercise sole discretion
over the choice of defense counsel. Does Faretta
"0 See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961), in
which the Court examined the common-law rule of dis-
qualification.
51422 U.S. 849.52 1d. at 852.
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imply that, after exercising his constitutional right
to reject a court-appointed attorney and to manage
his own defense, an accused may then exercise his
constitutional right to assistance of counsel by de-
manding a different attorney? A similar problem is
posed in that the Court has never explicitly held that
a defendant has a constitutional right to effective
counsel. But if the right to counsel belongs exclu-
sively to the defendant, he may be deprived of his
right to assistance of counsel when an attorney
appointed by the" court is ineffective. " In addition, it
is clear that the constitutional right to appear pro se
is not absolute. Under the rule of Illinois v. Allen, " a
defendant who represents himself may forfeit the
right to be heard at his trial by conduct which is so
unruly that the court finds it necessary to gag him or
to order him removed from the courtroom. What
other circumstances exist under which it is possible
for an accused to lose the right to represent himself?
It may be, as the Chief justice maintains, that the
Court in Faretta has broken new ground in Finding
that due process does not require the assistance of
counsel. On the other hand, the decision may be
understood as following logically from the equal
protection notions of the right to counsel cases; i.e.,
not that the presence of counsel is essential to the
existence of a fair trial, but that the state must
remove the unfair disadvantage to a defendant who
cannot, for financial reasons alone, obtain the assist-
ance of counsel, and that the opportunty for criminal
defendants to obtain counsel is all that fundamental
fairness requires. "
The prior cases do not precisely touch the issue
which divides the Justices in the instant case: the
scope of a trial judge's authority to deny a defend-
"In dissenting from the notion that an accused must
be permitted to conduct his defense personally, Justice
Blackmun appears to recognize a due process right to
effective counsel. Id. at 848.
54397 U.S. 337 (1970). In this case, the defendant,
appearing pro se during his trial for robbery, engaged in
repeated disruptive behavior. At the judge's order, he was
removed from the courtroom and the trial continued, the
defendant being represented by appointed counsel. In
holding that the right to attend trial may be lost by
misconduct, Justice Black for the majority listed three
"constitutionally permissible" ways for a trial judge to han-
dle an obstreperous defendant: (1) bind and gag him; (2)
cite him for contempt; and (3) have him removed from the
courtroom until he promises to behave.
"See also Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963), in
which the Court invalidated Indiana's procedure in denying
to an indigent defendant the ability to himself obtain a
transcript of his coram nobis proceeding while requiring
that a transcript is necessary in order to perfect an appeal.
This placed the power to appeal completely in the hands of
the public defender, who in his discretion could refuse to
procure the transcript.
ant's waiver of counsel when made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. The Court's holding
leaves the trial judge with the same discretionary
powers that he possesses with regard to other fifth
and sixth amendment rights. A judge may not, for
example, deny to a competent and willing defendant
the opportunity to testify and thereby waive his right
against self-incrimination; nor may a judge force an
unwilling defendant to subpoena witnesses. In this
sense, the Court appears to be saying that the right to
counsel is of the same order as other sixth amend-
ment rights and not a panacea which may be relied
upon to cure the procedural ills of a criminal trial.
In holding that the individual's freedom of choice
is of greater significance than the state's scheme of
"ordered liberty," the Court may be attempting to
alleviate some growing problems in the field of
criminal defense-problems to which the Court's
prior decisions have been a contributing factor. First,
it is a truism that the segment of the population
which is most in need of the services of the public
defender is most often distrustful of the establish-
ment. With no right to make his preference for an
individual attorney binding upon the court, an
indigent defendant may well regard his court-
appointed attorney as part of the panoply of state
power which is arrayed against him. The Supreme
Court has refused to insist that a defendant haled into
court on a criminal charge has no choice but to place
his future in the hands of one he may regard as his
adversary.
Second, it is no secret that public defenders are
often inadequately prepared due to lack of time
or resources. 56 But their clients may not be able
to obtain redress for even the most flagrant case of
incompetent representation. For example, if the
representation were so unskillful as to violate due
process of law, it would be a deprivation of a consti-
tutional right within the meaning of the Civil
Rights Acts. However, it is questionable that a sec-
tion 1983 action 17 may be maintained. The circuits
'OCJ. Wallace v. Kern, 392 F. Supp. 834 (E.D.N.Y.
1973), where the court held that indigent defendants were
denied effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the sixth
amendment because public defenders were overburdened by
excessive caseloads.
57Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
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are in conflict whether a public defender or other
court-appointed attorney acts under color of state
law and, if he does, whether he has quasi-judicial
immunity for his actions during trial.5 Quasi-
judicial immunity may also be raised as a bar to a
state action in tort. 59
Finally, the holding in Fuller v. Oregon 6'validat-
ing state recoupment statutes leaves the indigent ac-
cused open to the possibility of being compelled to
assume the burden of paying fees to an attorney he
neither wanted nor hired, a burden no other criminal
defendant must assume. He is also exposed to the
possibility of going to prison for that debt, a conse-
quence of the Court's approval of the Oregon stat-
ute's provision that parole might be revoked in the
case of a parolee who defaulted on his obligation.
Constitutionalizing the right to represent oneself is
58Some courts have found that public defenders and
other court-appointed attorneys have quasi-judicial immu-
nity from suit. See, e.g., John v. Hurt, 489 F.2d 786 (7th
Cir. 1973); Davis v. McAteer, 431 F.2d 81 (8th Cir. 1970).
Contra, McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972).
Others have held that court-appointed attorneys do not
act under color of state law, and therefore cannot be reached
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970): Barnes v. Dorsey, 480
F.2d 1057 (8th Cir. 1973); Brown v.Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046
(3rd Cir. 1972); Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231 (6th
Cir. 1968).
59See, e.g., the view of the Seventh Circuit in applying
the law of Illinois in a diversity malpractice suit: "IT]here
are strong reasons of policy... to hold that a lawyer, who
has been appointed to serve... in the defense of an indi-
gent citizen accused of crime, should be immune from mal-
practice liability." Walker v. Kruse, 484 F.2d 802, 804-05
(7th Cir. 1973). In states in which the legislature has pro-
vided tort immunity for state employees, still another
barrier may be raised.
60417 U.S. 40 (1974). In this case, the indigent accused
entered a guilty plea and, under a work/release program,
was given a probationary sentence, the court imposing as a
condition of probation that the defendant reimburse the
county for fees and expenses of the attorney and investigator
which the court had provided. The Supreme Court, Justice
Stewart for the majority, held that there was no violation of
one method of limiting those possibilities. However,
when to the rule in Fuller (that a state may compel
an indigent defendant who subsequently becomes
solvent to pay for legal services during trial) is added
the Faretta doctrine (that there is no constitutional
necessity to provide counsel for a defendant who
wishes to represent himself), a "chilling effect" on
exercise of the right to counsel may be preceived.
There will, of course, be no way of knowing how
many, if any, indigent defendants will in the fu-
ture opt for self-representation to avoid the possibility
of later-imposed fees.
While it is arguable that a pro se defendant is
more likely to lose at trial than one represented by
counsel,61 the Court in Faretta has refused to
interpret the right to counsel cases to mean that
presence of counsel is essential to the existence of a
fair trial. It has instead held that (1) due process is
satisfied by the exercise of free choice by an accused;
(2) the trial court may not appoint counsel over the
objections of a competent defendant who wishes to
appear pro se; and (3) the trial judge's discretion as
to a defendant's attempt to refuse assistance of coun-
sel is limited by the Constitution to a determination
of whether an attempted waiver of counsel is prop-
erly made. The Court has found an accused's free-
dom of choice to be a right superior to the State's
interest in the administration of justice. Clearly,
however, the state's system of justice is of legitimate
concern to its courts. Thus, the immediate effect of
this case will be that the courts must begin the task
of laying down rules of procedure for criminal cases
in which the defendant seeks to represent himself.
the fourteenth amendment by the Oregon recoupment
statutes, which permit this disposition. ORE. REV. STAT. §§
161.665, .675, .685 (1971).
61Comment, The Right to Appear Pro Se: the Constitu-
tion and the Courts, 64 J. CRIM. L. & C., 240, 247-49
(1973).
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